حجة بيناتار بشأن عدم التناظر

يشرح بيناتار عدم التماثل الرئيسي باستخدام أربعة أنواع أخرى من عدم التماثل التي يعتبرها معقولة تمامًا: ^{[ 2 ] [ 4 ]}

• عدم التماثل في واجبات الإنجاب : لدينا التزام أخلاقي بعدم إنجاب أشخاص تعساء، وليس لدينا التزام أخلاقي بإنجاب أشخاص سعداء. السبب الذي يجعلنا نعتقد بوجود التزام أخلاقي بعدم إنجاب أشخاص تعساء هو أن وجود هذه المعاناة سيكون سيئًا (للمتألمين)، وغياب المعاناة سيكون جيدًا (مع أنه لا يوجد من يستمتع بغياب المعاناة). في المقابل، السبب الذي يجعلنا نعتقد بعدم وجود التزام أخلاقي بإنجاب أشخاص سعداء هو أنه على الرغم من أن سعادتهم ستكون جيدة لهم، فإن غياب السعادة عند عدم وجودهم لن يكون سيئًا، لأنه لن يكون هناك من يُحرم من هذا الخير.
• The prospective beneficence asymmetry: it is strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide to create them, and it is not strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide not to create them. That the child may be happy is not a morally important reason to create them. By contrast, that the child may be unhappy is an important moral reason not to create them. If it were the case that the absence of pleasure is bad even if someone does not exist to experience its absence, then we would have a significant moral reason to create a child and to create as many children as possible. And if it were not the case that the absence of pain is good even if someone does not exist to experience this good, then we would not have a significant moral reason not to create a child.
• The retrospective beneficence asymmetry: someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing. But we will never feel regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we did not create them – a person will not be deprived of happiness, because they will never exist, and the absence of happiness will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
• The asymmetry of distant suffering and absent happy people: we feel sadness by the fact that somewhere people come into existence and suffer, and we feel no sadness by the fact that somewhere people did not come into existence in a place where there are happy people. When we know that somewhere people came into existence and suffer, we feel compassion. The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. This is because the absence of pain is good even when there is not someone who is experiencing this good. On the other hand, we do not feel sadness by the fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and are not happy. This is because the absence of pleasure is bad only when someone exists to be deprived of this good.