نظرية المادة

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الموسوعة الحرة

نظرية الجوهر ، أو نظرية الجوهر والصفة ، هي نظرية وجودية تفترض أن الأشياء تتكون من جوهر وخصائص يحملها هذا الجوهر، لكنها متميزة عنه. في هذا السياق، يُمكن الإشارة إلى الجوهر على أنه ركيزة أو شيء في ذاته . [ 1 ] [ 2 ] الجواهر هي أجزاء مستقلة وجوديًا : فهي قادرة على الوجود بذاتها. [ 3 ] [ 4 ] ومن السمات المميزة الأخرى التي تُنسب غالبًا إلى الجواهر قدرتها على التغير . يشمل التغير وجود شيء ما قبل التغير وأثناءه وبعده . ويمكن وصفه من حيث اكتساب الجوهر المستمر لخصائص أو فقدانها. [ 3 ] أما الصفات أو الخصائص ، فهي كيانات يمكن أن تُمثلها الجواهر. [ 5 ] تُحدد الخصائص حامليها؛ فهي تُعبر عن ماهية حاملها. [ 4 ]

يُعدّ الجوهر مفهومًا أساسيًا في علم الوجود ، الذي بدوره جزء من الميتافيزيقا ، والتي يمكن تصنيفها إلى أنواع أحادية وثنائية وتعددية ، وذلك بحسب عدد الجواهر أو الأفراد التي يُقال إنها تسكن العالم أو تُشكّله أو توجد فيه. وفقًا للرؤى الأحادية، لا يوجد سوى جوهر واحد. فالرواقية وسبينوزا ، على سبيل المثال، يتبنيان وجهات نظر أحادية، إذ يعتبران الروح أو الله ، على التوالي، الجوهر الوحيد في العالم. وترتبط هذه الأنماط الفكرية أحيانًا بفكرة الحلولية . أما الثنائية فترى العالم مُكوّنًا من جوهرين أساسيين (على سبيل المثال، ثنائية الجوهر الديكارتية بين العقل والمادة ) . وتشمل الفلسفات التعددية نظرية المُثُل لأفلاطون وفئات أرسطو الهيولية .

الفلسفة اليونانية القديمة

أرسطو

Aristotle used the term "substance" (Greek: οὐσίαousia) in a secondary sense for genera and species understood as hylomorphic forms. Primarily, however, he used it with regard to his category of substance, the specimen ("this person" or "this horse") or individual, qua individual, who survives accidental change and in whom the essential properties inhere that define those universals.

A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called secondary substances.[6]

—Aristotle, Categories 2a13 (trans. J. L. Ackrill)

In chapter 6 of book I the Physics Aristotle argues that any change must be analysed in reference to the property of an invariant subject: as it was before the change and thereafter. Thus, in his hylomorphic account of change, what is known as prime matter serves as a relative substratum of transformation, i.e. prime matter as a metaphysical principal in pure potency for the reception of a substantial form. In the Categories, properties are predicated only of substance, but in chapter 7 of book I of the Physics, Aristotle discusses substances coming to be and passing away in the "unqualified sense" wherein primary substances (πρῶται οὐσίαι; Categories 2a35) are generated from (or perish into) a material substratum by having gained (or lost) the essential property that formally defines substances of that kind (in the secondary sense). Examples of such a substantial change include not only conception and dying, but also metabolism, e.g., the bread a man eats becomes the man. On the other hand, in accidental change, because the essential property remains unchanged, by identifying the substance with its formal essence, substance may thereby serve as the relative subject matter or property-bearer of change in a qualified sense (i.e., barring matters of life or death). An example of this sort of accidental change is a change of color or size: a tomato becomes red, or a juvenile horse grows.

Aristotle thinks that in addition to primary substances (which are particulars), there are secondary substances (δεύτεραι οὐσίαι), which are universals (Categories 2a11–a18).[7]

However, according to Aristotle's theology, a form of invariant form exists without matter, beyond the cosmos, powerless and oblivious, in the eternal substance of the unmoved mover.

Pyrrhonism

Early Pyrrhonism rejected the idea that substances exist. Pyrrho put this as:

"Whoever wants to live well (eudaimonia) must consider these three questions: First, how are pragmata (ethical matters, affairs, topics) by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?" Pyrrho's answer is that "As for pragmata they are all adiaphora (undifferentiated by a logical differentia), astathmēta (unstable, unbalanced, not measurable), and anepikrita (unjudged, unfixed, undecidable). Therefore, neither our sense-perceptions nor our doxai (views, theories, beliefs) tell us the truth or lie; so we certainly should not rely on them. Rather, we should be adoxastoi (without views), aklineis (uninclined toward this side or that), and akradantoi (unwavering in our refusal to choose), saying about every single one, that it no more ‘is’, than it ‘is not’; or it both ‘is’ and ‘is not’, or it neither ‘is’, nor ‘is not’.[8]

Stoicism

The Stoics rejected the idea that incorporeal beings inhere in matter, as taught by Plato. They believed that all being is corporeal infused with a creative fire called pneuma. Thus they developed a scheme of categories different from Aristotle's based on the ideas of Anaxagoras and Timaeus. The fundamental basis of Stoicism in this context was a universally consistent ethical and moral code that should be maintained at all time, the physical belief of beings as matter is an important philosophical footnote, as it marked the start of thinking as beings as inherently linked to reality, instead of to some abstract heaven.[9][10]

Neoplatonism

Neoplatonists argue that beneath the surface phenomena that present themselves to our senses are three higher spiritual principles or hypostases, each one more sublime than the preceding. For Plotinus, these are the soul or world-soul, being/intellect or divine mind (nous), and "the one".[11]

Early modern philosophy

René Descartes means by a substance an entity which exists in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to exist. Therefore, only God is a substance in this strict sense. However, he extends the term to created things, which need only the concurrence of God to exist. He maintained that two of these are mind and body, each being distinct from the other in their attributes and therefore in their essence, and neither needing the other in order to exist. This is Descartes' substance dualism.

Baruch Spinoza denied Descartes' "real distinction" between mind and matter. Substance, according to Spinoza, is one and indivisible, but has multiple "attributes". He regards an attribute, though, as "what we conceive as constituting the [single] essence of substance". The single essence of one substance can be conceived of as material and also, consistently, as mental. What is ordinarily called the natural world, together with all the individuals in it, is immanent in God: hence his famous phrase deus sive natura ("God or Nature").

ينظر جون لوك إلى المادة من منظور الجسيميات، حيث تُظهر نوعين من الصفات، كلاهما ينبع من مصدر واحد. وهو يعتقد أن الإنسان يولد صفحة بيضاء ، أي بلا معرفة فطرية. في مقالته "مقال في الفهم البشري " ، يكتب لوك أن "الجوهر الأول يُمكن اعتباره جوهر أي شيء، الذي به يكون ما هو عليه". إذا كان الإنسان يولد بلا معرفة، فإن سبيل اكتساب المعرفة يكون من خلال إدراك شيء ما. ولكن، وفقًا للوك، يوجد الشيء بصفاته الأولية، سواء أدركه الإنسان أم لا؛ فهو موجود فحسب. على سبيل المثال، للتفاحة صفات أو خصائص تُحدد وجودها بمعزل عن إدراك الإنسان لها، مثل كتلتها أو ملمسها. والتفاحة نفسها أيضًا "مادة خالصة يُفترض أن تُوفر نوعًا من 'الدعم المجهول' للصفات الملحوظة للأشياء" التي يُدركها العقل البشري. [ 12 ] تُسمى الصفات الأساسية أو الداعمة بالجواهر الأولية، وهي "في حالة المواد الفيزيائية، الأسباب الفيزيائية الكامنة وراء الصفات الملحوظة للشيء". [ 13 ] ولكن ما هو الشيء إذن إلا "مالك أو داعم لصفات أخرى"؟ يرفض لوك تصنيف أرسطو للمُثُل، ويُطور أفكارًا مُختلطة حول معنى الجوهر أو "الجوهر الأول". يتمثل حل لوك للالتباس حول الجوهر الأول في القول بأن الأشياء ببساطة هي ما هي عليه - مُكوّنة من جسيمات مجهرية موجودة لمجرد وجودها. ووفقًا للوك، لا يستطيع العقل استيعاب فكرة الجوهر بشكل كامل لأنها "دائمًا ما تقع خارج نطاق المعرفة". [ 14 ] هناك فجوة بين ما يعنيه الجوهر الأول حقًا وإدراك العقل له، وهي فجوة يعتقد لوك أن العقل لا يستطيع سدّها، إذ يجب أن توجد الأشياء بصفاتها الأولية بمعزل عن الإدراك البشري.

يشكل التركيب الجزيئي للذرات في جوهرها الأساسي القاعدة الصلبة التي يستطيع الإنسان إدراكها وإضافة صفات لوصفها - وهي الطريقة الوحيدة التي يمكن للإنسان من خلالها البدء في إدراك شيء ما. فعلى سبيل المثال، يتم إدراك صفات التفاحة من خلال دمج الصفات الأولية لتكوين الصفات الثانوية. تُستخدم هذه الصفات بعد ذلك لتصنيف المواد إلى فئات مختلفة "تعتمد على الخصائص التي يستطيع الإنسان إدراكها". [ 14 ] إن طعم التفاحة أو ملمسها الناعم ليسا صفتين متأصلتين في الثمرة، بل هما قدرة الصفات الأولية على تكوين فكرة عنها في الذهن. [ 15 ] والسبب في عدم قدرة الإنسان على إدراك الصفات الأولية الفعلية هو البعد الذهني عن الشيء؛ ولذلك، كما يرى لوك، تبقى الأشياء اسمية بالنسبة للإنسان. [ 16 ] ومن ثم، يعود النقاش إلى كيف أن "الفيلسوف لا يملك فكرة أخرى عن تلك المواد سوى ما تشكله مجموعة من تلك الأفكار البسيطة الموجودة فيها". [ 17 ] إن تصور العقل للمواد "معقد وليس بسيطاً"، و"لا يملك فكرة واضحة ومميزة (يفترض أنها فطرية) عن المادة يمكن الكشف عنها من خلال التجريد الفكري بعيداً عن الصفات الحسية". [ 12 ]

الصفة الأخيرة للمادة هي الطريقة التي تبدو بها الصفات المُدرَكة وكأنها تبدأ بالتغير، مثل ذوبان الشمعة؛ تُسمى هذه الصفة بالصفة الثالثية. الصفات الثالثية للجسم هي تلك القوى التي فيه، بفضل صفاته الأولية، تُعطيه القدرة على إحداث تغييرات ملحوظة في الصفات الأولية لأجسام أخرى؛ "قدرة الشمس على إذابة الشمع هي صفة ثالثية للشمس". [ 13 ] إنها "مجرد قوى؛ صفات مثل المرونة، والليونة؛ وقدرة الشمس على إذابة الشمع". وهذا يتوافق مع "القوة الكامنة: قدرة الشيء على أن يتغير بفعل شيء آخر". [ 18 ] في أي جسم، تكمن في جوهره الصفات الأولية (التي لا يمكن للعقل البشري إدراكها)، والصفة الثانوية (كيفية إدراك الصفات الأولية)، والصفات الثالثية (قدرة الصفات مجتمعة على إحداث تغيير في الجسم نفسه أو في أجسام أخرى).

Robert Boyle's corpuscularian hypothesis states that "all material bodies are composites of ultimately small particles of matter" that "have the same material qualities as the larger composite bodies do".[19] Using this basis, Locke defines his first group, primary qualities, as "the ones that a body doesn't lose, however much it alters."[20] The materials retain their primary qualities even if they are broken down because of the unchanging nature of their atomic particles. [19] If someone is curious about an object and they say it is solid and extended, these two descriptors are primary qualities.[21] The second group consists of secondary qualities which are "really nothing but the powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities."[22] Locke argues that the impressions our senses perceive from the objects (i.e. taste, sounds, colors, etc.) are not natural properties of the object itself, but things they induce in us by means of the "size, shape, texture, and motion of their imperceptible parts."[22] The bodies send insensible particles to our senses which let us perceive the object through different faculties; what we perceive is based on the object's composition. With these qualities, people can achieve the object through bringing "co-existing powers and sensible qualities to a common ground for explanation".[23] Locke supposes that one wants to know what "binds these qualities" into an object, and argues that a "substratum" or "substance" has this effect, defining "substance" as follows:

[T]he idea of ours to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of those qualities we find existing and which we imagine can't exist sine re substante — that is, without some thing to support them — we call that support substantia; which, according to the true meaning of the word, is in plain English standing under or upholding.

—John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding; book 2, chapter 23[24]

This substratum is a construct of the mind in an attempt to bind all the qualities seen together; it is only "a supposition of an unknown support of qualities that are able to cause simple ideas in us."[24] Without making a substratum, people would be at a loss as to how different qualities relate. Locke does, however, mention that this substratum is an unknown, relating it to the story of the world on the turtle's back and how the believers eventually had to concede that the turtle just rested on "something he knew not what".[24] This is how the mind perceives all things and from which it can make ideas about them; it is entirely relative, but it does provide a "regularity and consistency to our ideas".[21] Substance, overall, has two sets of qualities — those that define it, and those related to how we perceive it. These qualities rush to our minds, which must organize them. As a result, our mind creates a substratum (or substance) for these objects, into which it groups related qualities.

Criticism of soul as substance

Kant observed that the assertion of a spiritual soul as substance could be a synthetic proposition which, however, was unproved and completely arbitrary.[25] Introspection does not reveal any diachronic substrate remaining unchanged throughout life. The temporal structure of consciousness is retentive-perceptive-prognostic. The selfhood arises as result of several informative flows: (1) signals from our own body; (2) retrieved memories and forecasts; (3) the affective load: dispositions and aversions; (4) reflections in other minds.[26] Mental acts have the feature of appropriation: they are always attached to some pre-reflective consciousness.[27] As visual perception is only possible from a definite point of view, so inner experience is given together with self-consciousness. The latter is not an autonomous mental act, but a formal way how the first person has their experience. From the pre-reflective consciousness, the person gains conviction of their existence. This conviction is immune to false reference.[28] The concept of person is prior to the concepts of subject and body.[29] The reflective self-consciousness is a conceptual and elaborate cognition. Selfhood is a self-constituting effigy, a task to be accomplished.[30] Humans are incapable of comprising all their experience within the current state of consciousness; overlapping memories are critical for personal integrity. Appropriated experience can be recollected. At stage B, we remember the experience of stage A; at stage C, we may be aware of the mental acts of stage B. The idea of self-identity is enforced by the relatively slow changes of our body and social situation.[31] Personal identity may be explained without accepting a spiritual agent as subject of mental activity.[32] Associative connection between life episodes is necessary and sufficient for the maintenance of a united selfhood. Personal character and memories can persist after radical mutation of the body.[33]

Irreducible concepts

Two irreducible concepts encountered in substance theory are the bare particular and inherence.

Bare particular

In substance theory, a bare particular of an object is the element without which the object would not exist, that is, its substance, which exists independently from its properties, even if it is impossible for it to lack properties entirely. It is "bare" because it is considered without its properties and "particular" because it is not abstract. The properties that the substance has are said to inhere in the substance.

Inherence

Another primitive concept in substance theory is the inherence of properties within a substance. For example, in the sentence, "The apple is red" substance theory says that red inheres in the apple. Substance theory takes the meaning of an apple having the property of redness to be understood, and likewise that of a property's inherence in substance, which is similar to, but not identical with, being part of the substance.

The inverse relation is participation. Thus in the example above, just as red inheres in the apple, so the apple participates in red.

Arguments supporting the theory

Two common arguments supporting substance theory are the argument from grammar and the argument from conception.

Argument from grammar

The argument from grammar uses traditional grammar to support substance theory. For example, the sentence "Snow is white" contains a grammatical subject "snow" and the predicate "is white", thereby asserting snow is white. The argument holds that it makes no grammatical sense to speak of "whiteness" disembodied, without asserting that snow or something else is white. Meaningful assertions are formed by virtue of a grammatical subject, of which properties may be predicated, and in substance theory, such assertions are made with regard to a substance.

Bundle theory rejects the argument from grammar on the basis that a grammatical subject does not necessarily refer to a metaphysical subject. Bundle theory, for example, maintains that the grammatical subject of a statement refers to its properties. For example, a bundle theorist understands the grammatical subject of the sentence, "Snow is white", to be a bundle of properties such as white. Accordingly, one can make meaningful statements about bodies without referring to substances.

Argument from conception

Another argument for the substance theory is the argument from conception. The argument claims that in order to conceive of an object's properties, like the redness of an apple, one must conceive of the object that has those properties. According to the argument, one cannot conceive of redness, or any other property, distinct from the substance that has that property.

Criticism

The idea of substance was famously critiqued by David Hume,[34] who held that since substance cannot be perceived, it should not be assumed to independently exist.[35]

Friedrich Nietzsche, and after him Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze also rejected the notion of "substance", and in the same movement the concept of subject–seeing both concepts as holdovers from Platonic idealism. For this reason, Althusser's "anti-humanism" and Foucault's statements were criticized, by Jürgen Habermas and others, for misunderstanding that this led to a fatalist conception of social determinism. For Habermas, only a subjective form of liberty could be conceived, to the contrary of Deleuze who talks about "a life", as an impersonal and immanent form of liberty.

For Heidegger, Descartes means by "substance" that by which "we can understand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it need no other entity in order to be." Therefore, only God is a substance as Ens perfectissimus (most perfect being). Heidegger showed the inextricable relationship between the concept of substance and of subject, which explains why, instead of talking about "man" or "humankind", he speaks about the Dasein, which is not a simple subject, nor a substance.[36]

Alfred North Whitehead has argued that the concept of substance has only a limited applicability in everyday life and that metaphysics should rely upon the concept of process.[37]

Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, as part of his critique of transubstantiation, rejected substance theory and instead proposed the doctrine of transfinalization, which he felt was more attuned to modern philosophy. However, this doctrine was rejected by Pope Paul VI in his encyclical Mysterium fidei.

Bundle theory

In direct opposition to substance theory is bundle theory, whose most basic premise is that all concrete particulars are merely constructions or 'bundles' of attributes or qualitative properties:

Necessarily, for any concrete entity, a{\displaystyle a}, if for any entity, b{\displaystyle b}, b{\displaystyle b} is a constituent of a{\displaystyle a}, then b{\displaystyle b} is an attribute.[38]

The bundle theorist's principal objections to substance theory concern the bare particulars of a substance, which substance theory considers independently of the substance's properties. The bundle theorist objects to the notion of a thing with no properties, claiming that such a thing is inconceivable and citing John Locke, who described a substance as "a something, I know not what." To the bundle theorist, as soon as one has any notion of a substance in mind, a property accompanies that notion.

Identity of indiscernibles counterargument

The indiscernibility argument from the substance theorist targets those bundle theorists who are also metaphysical realists. Metaphysical realism uses the identity of universals to compare and identify particulars. Substance theorists say that bundle theory is incompatible with metaphysical realism due to the identity of indiscernibles: particulars may differ from one another only with respect to their attributes or relations.

The substance theorist's indiscernibility argument against the metaphysically realistic bundle theorist states that numerically different concrete particulars are discernible from the self-same concrete particular only by virtue of qualitatively different attributes.

Necessarily, for any complex objects, a{\displaystyle a} and b{\displaystyle b}, if for any entity, c{\displaystyle c}, c{\displaystyle c} is a constituent of a{\displaystyle a} if and only if c{\displaystyle c} is a constituent of b{\displaystyle b}, then a{\displaystyle a} is numerically identical with b{\displaystyle b}.[38]

The indiscernibility argument points out that if bundle theory and discernible concrete particulars theory explain the relationship between attributes, then the identity of indiscernibles theory must also be true:

Necessarily, for any concrete objects, a{\displaystyle a} and b{\displaystyle b}, if for any attribute, Φ, Φ is an attribute of a{\displaystyle a} if and only if Φ is an attribute of b{\displaystyle b}, then a{\displaystyle a} is numerically identical with b{\displaystyle b}.[38]

The indiscernibles argument then asserts that the identity of indiscernibles is violated, for example, by identical sheets of paper. All of their qualitative properties are the same (e.g. white, rectangular, 9 x 11 inches...) and thus, the argument claims, bundle theory and metaphysical realism cannot both be correct.

However, bundle theory combined with trope theory (as opposed to metaphysical realism) avoids the indiscernibles argument because each attribute is a trope if can only be held by only one concrete particular.

The argument does not consider whether "position" should be considered an attribute or relation. It is after all through the differing positions that we in practice differentiate between otherwise identical pieces of paper.

Religious philosophy

Christianity

The Christian writers of antiquity adhered to the Aristotelian conception of substance. Their peculiarity was the use of this idea for the discernment of theological nuances. Clement of Alexandria considered both material and spiritual substances: blood and milk; mind and soul, respectively.[39]Origen may be the first theologian expressing Christ's similarity with the Father as consubstantiality. Tertullian professed the same view in the West.[40] The ecclesiastics of the Cappadocian group (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa) taught that the Trinity had a single substance in three hypostases individualized by the relations among them. In later ages, the meaning of "substance" became more important because of the dogma of the Eucharist. Hildebert of Lavardin, archbishop of Tours, introduced the term transubstantiation about 1080; its use spread after the Fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215.

According to Thomas Aquinas, beings may possess substance in three different modes. Together with other Medieval philosophers, he interpreted God's epithet "El Shaddai" (Genesis 17:1) as self-sufficient and concluded that God's essence was identical with existence.[41] Aquinas also deemed the substance of spiritual creatures identical with their essence (or form); therefore he considered each angel to belong to its own distinct species.[42] In Aquinas' view, composite substances consist of form and matter. Human substantial form, i.e. soul, receives its individuality from body.[43]

Jainism

Buddhism

Buddhism rejects the concept of substance. Complex structures are comprehended as an aggregate of components without any essence. Just as the junction of parts is called cart, so the collections of elements are called things.[44] All formations are unstable (aniccā) and lacking any constant core or "self" (anattā).[45] Physical objects have no metaphysical substrate.[46] Arising entities hang on previous ones conditionally: in the notable teaching on interdependent origination, effects arise not as caused by agents but conditioned by former situations. Our senses, perception, feelings, wishes and consciousness are flowing, the view satkāya-dṛṣṭi of their permanent carrier is rejected as fallacious. The school of Madhyamaka, namely Nāgārjuna, introduced the idea of the ontological void (śūnyatā). The Buddhist metaphysics Abhidharma presumes particular forces which determine the origin, persistence, aging and decay of everything in the world. Vasubandhu added a special force making a human, called "aprāpti" or "pṛthagjanatvam".[47] Because of the absence of a substantial soul, the belief in personal immortality loses foundation.[48] Instead of deceased beings, new ones emerge whose fate is destined by the karmic law. The Buddha admitted the empirical identity of persons testified by their birth, name, and age. He approved the authorship of deeds and responsibility of performers.[49] The disciplinary practice in the Sangha including reproaches, confession and expiation of transgressions,[50] requires continuing personalities as its justification.

See also

References

  1. ↑Benovsky, Jiri (2008). "The Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory: Deadly Enemies or Twin Brothers?". Philosophical Studies. 141 (2): 175–190. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9158-0. S2CID 18712931.
  2. ↑Rae Langton (2001). Kantian humility: our ignorance of things in themselves. Oxford University Press. p. 28. ISBN 0-19-924317-4.
  3. 12Kim, Jaegwon; Sosa, Ernest; Rosenkrantz, Gary S. (1994). "substance". A Companion to Metaphysics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  4. 12Borchert, Donald (2006). "Ontology". Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. Macmillan.
  5. ↑Orilia, Francesco; Paolini Paoletti, Michele (2020). "Properties". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
  6. ↑Ackrill, J.L. (1988). A New Aristotle Reader. Princeton University Press. p. 7. ISBN 9781400835829.
  7. ↑Studtmann, Paul (January 9, 2018). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Aristotle's Categories. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. ↑Beckwith, Christopher I. (2015). Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia(PDF). Princeton University Press. pp. 22–23. ISBN 9781400866328.
  9. ↑LEWIS, ERIC (1988). "Diogenes Laertius and the Stoic Theory of Mixture". Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. 35 (35): 84–90. doi:10.1111/j.2041-5370.1988.tb00202.x. JSTOR 43646211.
  10. ↑Robertson, David G. (1998). "Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance in Basil of Caesarea". Vigiliae Christianae. 52 (4): 393–417. doi:10.2307/1584833. JSTOR 1584833.
  11. ↑Neoplatonism (Ancient Philosophies) by Pauliina Remes (2008), University of California Press ISBN 0520258347, pages 48–52.
  12. 12Millican, Peter (2015). "Locke on Substance and Our Ideas of Substances". In Paul Lodge; Tom Stoneham (eds.). Locke and Leibniz on Substance. Routledge. pp. 8–27.
  13. 12Jones, Jan-Erik. "Locke on Real Essence". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  14. 12Dunn, John (2003). Locke: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
  15. ↑Jones, Jan-Erik (July 2016). "Locke On Real Essence". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  16. ↑Atherton, Margaret (1999). The Empiricists: Critical Essays on Locke, Berkely, and Hume. Rowman and Littlefield.
  17. ↑Locke, John (1959). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Dover Publications.
  18. ↑Garret, Jan (February 27, 2004). "A Lockean Glossary". A Lockean Glossary.
  19. 12Sheridan, P. (2010). Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. pp. 34, 38.
  20. ↑John Locke (August 2007) [1690]. "Book II, chapter 8, paragraph 9"(PDF). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Translated by Jonathan Bennett.
  21. 12Stumpf, S. E. (1999). Socrates to Sartre: a history of philosophy. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. p. 260.
  22. 12John Locke (August 2007) [1690]. "Book II, chapter 8, paragraph 10"(PDF). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Translated by Jonathan Bennett.
  23. ↑Constantin, Ion (2012). "Philosophy of substance: a historical perspective". Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations. 11: 135–140. ProQuest 1030745650.
  24. 123John Locke (August 2007) [1690]. "Book II, chapter 23, paragraph 2"(PDF). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Translated by Jonathan Bennett.
  25. ↑Kant. Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer, Allen Wood. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge (UK), New York, Melbourne, 1998, p.422-425. ISBN 0-521-35402-1
  26. ↑Seth, Anil K. The hard problem of consciousness is a distraction from the real one. Retrieved 14.01.2017 from https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real one
  27. ↑Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. Routledge: London, [1996], p. XXVI-XXXII. ISBN 0-415-04029-9
  28. ↑Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. Blackwell: [Oxford], [1958], p. 67. ISBN 0-631-14660-1
  29. ↑Strawson P. Individuals. Methuen: London., 1959, p.98-103
  30. ↑Wisdo, David (28 July 2017). "The Self: Kierkegaard and Buddhism in Dialogue". Comparative Philosophy. 8 (2). doi:10.31979/2151-6014(2017).080209.
  31. ↑Ayer A.J. Language, Truth and Logic. Penguin Books: [s.l.], 1946, p. 166-168
  32. ↑Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan, "Phenomenological Approaches in Self-Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/
  33. ↑Quinton, Anthony (1962). "The Soul". The Journal of Philosophy. 59 (15): 393–409. doi:10.2307/2022957. JSTOR 2022957.
  34. ↑Hockney, Mike (2015). The Forbidden History of Science. Hyperreality Books.
  35. ↑Robinson, Howard; Weir, Ralph (Spring 2020). "Substance". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 1095-5054. OCLC 429049174.
  36. ↑A. Kadir Cucen (2002-01-18). "Heidegger's Critique of Descartes' Metaphysics"(PDF). Uludag University. Retrieved 2011-12-28.
  37. ↑See, e.g., Ronny Desmet and Michel Weber (edited by), Whitehead. The Algebra of Metaphysics. Applied Process Metaphysics Summer Institute Memorandum, Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions Chromatika, 2010 (ISBN 978-2-930517-08-7).
  38. 123Loux, M.J. (2002). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Series. Taylor & Francis. pp. 106–107, 110. ISBN 9780415140348. LCCN 97011036.
  39. ↑Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, VIII, 6; IV, 32; VI, 6
  40. ↑Tertulianus adversus Marcionem, lib. IV, 9, 7.
  41. ↑Thomas Aquinas (1997). "V". De ente et essentia. Translated by Robert T. Miller.
  42. ↑Aquinas, Thomas. "First Part, Question 50, article 4". Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne.
  43. ↑Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, VI; Summa Theologica, q.29, a.1
  44. ↑The Collection of Connected Discourses (Saṁyutta Nikāya), Translated from the Pāli by Bikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom Publications, [2000]. Part 1, 525–526; Part 2, 61 (1). ISBN 0-86171-168-8
  45. ↑Aṅguttara Nikāya (The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha). A complete translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2012, III, 137
  46. ↑Stcherbatsky Th. The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma". London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923, p. 12
  47. ↑L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Traduit et annoté par Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Tome I. Paris: Paul Geithner, 1923, p. 179–191
  48. ↑The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (Majjhima Nikāya). Translated by Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli, Boston (MA): Wisdom Publications, 1995, Part 1, 22 (25)
  49. ↑Aṅguttara Nikāya, VI, 63 (5); III, 36 (1)
  50. ↑The Book of Discipline (Vinaya-Pitaka). Vol. II (Sutta-Vibhanga). Translated by I. B. Horner. London: Luzac, 1957, passim